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Abstract—Correlated sources are present in communication
systems where protocols ensure that there is some predetermined
information for sources to transmit. Here, two correlated sources
across a channel with eavesdroppers are investigated, and con-
ditions for perfect secrecy when some channel information and
some source data symbols (the predetermined information) have
been wiretapped are determined. The adversary in this situation
has access to more information than if a link is wiretapped only
and can thus determine more about a particular source. This
scenario caters for an application where the eavesdropper has
access to some preexisting information. We provide bounds for
the channel and key rates for this scenario. Further, we provide
a method to reduce the key lengths required for perfect secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Practical communication systems make use of correlated
sources, for example smart grid meters. Each smart grid meter
for a particular grid conforms to certain protocols and this
means that certain information (e.g. date, area, etc.) in the
header files will be the same for various meters. From the
receiver’s (or an eavesdropper’s) perspective, it appears as
common information shared between the meters. This is there-
fore pre-existing or known information for an eavesdropper.
Thus, correlated source scenarios exist in abundance in sys-
tems transmitting information as dictated by communication
protocols, e.g. smart grid meter systems. This implies that the
theory used for correlated sources may also be applied to these
types of systems.
Correlated source coding incorporates the lossless compres-
sion of two or more correlated data streams. It has the ability
to decrease the bandwidth required to transmit and receive
messages because a compressed form of the original message
is sent across the communication links instead of the original
message. A compressed message has more information per
bit, and therefore has a higher entropy because the transmitted
information is more unpredictable. The unpredictability of the
compressed message is also beneficial for the information
security. Correlated source coding has come about to negate
the security defect that is experienced when transmitting
common information across channels; if one source’s common
information is known and it is known that the source is
correlated to another source then information abotu the second
source is also known.
In practical communication systems links are prone to
eavesdropping and as such this work incorporates eaves-
dropped links. In work by Aggarwal et al. [1] it is seen
that an eavesdropper can be active and can erase/modify bits.
They develop a perfect secrecy model for this scenario. The
eavesdropper that we investigate is a passive wiretapper, who
cannot modify information. A wiretap channel has been used
to indicate a scenario with an eavesdropper. The mathematical
model for a wiretap channel has been given by Rouayheb et
al. [2], and can be explained as follows: the channel between
a transmitter and receiver is error-free and can transmit n
symbols from which µ of them can be observed by the
eavesdropper and the maximum secure rate can be shown to
equal n − µ symbols. The wiretap channel II was described
by Ozarow and Wyner [3] with a coset coding scheme. A
variation of the Gaussian wiretap channel has been investigated
by Mitrpant et al. [4]. Characteristics on this channel were
introduced by Luo et al. [5]. The characteristics focused on
were those pertaining to Hamming weights and Hamming dis-
tances in order to determine the equivocation of a wiretapper.
Thereafter, the security aspect of wiretap networks has been
looked at in various ways by Cheng et al. [6], and Cai and
Yeung [7], emphasizing that it is of concern to secure this type
of channel.
The difference between the original wiretap channel and the
wiretap channel II is that the latter is error free. In an inter-
esting application of the wiretap channel and wiretap channel
of type II, Dai et al. [8] presented a model that incorporates
compromised encoded bits and wiretapped bits from a noisy
channel. Here, we consider a scenario where an eavesdropper
has access to more than just the bits from the communication
links. Luo et al. [5], in some previous work, have described
this sort of adversary as more powerful. In addition to the
eavesdropped bits from the communication links, the eaves-
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2dropper also has access to some data symbols from the source.
In other previous work [9], the information leakage for two
correlated sources when some channel information from the
communication links had been wiretapped was investigated.
The information leakage for the model described in Section II
has also previously been analyzed [10]. Intuitively from this
work, it is seen that there is indeed more information gained
by the more powerful eavesdropper. This makes it easier for
the eavesdropper to determine the transmitted message and
information about the alternate source.
This extra information that the eavesdropper has access to
can be considered as side information to assist with decoding.
Villard and Piantanida [11] have also looked at correlated
sources: A source sends information to the receiver and
an eavesdropper has access to information correlated to the
source, which is used as side information. There is a second
encoder that sends a compressed version of its own correlation
observation of the source privately to the receiver. Here, the
authors show that the use of correlation decreases the required
communication rate and increases secrecy. Villard et al. [12]
have explored this side information concept further where se-
curity using side information at the receiver and eavesdropper
is investigated. Side information is generally used to assist
the decoder to determine the transmitted message. An earlier
work involving side information was done by Yang et al. [13].
The concept can be considered to be generalized in that the
side information could represent a source. It is an interesting
problem when one source is more important and Hayashi and
Yamamoto [14] have considered it in another scheme with two
sources, where only one source is secure against wiretappers
and the other must be transmitted to a legitimate receiver. They
develop a security criterion based on the number of correct
guesses of a wiretapper to attain a message. In this paper the
source data symbols may be seen as side information to the
eavesdropper, which is depicted in Section II.
In cryptographic systems, there is usually a message in
plaintext that needs to be sent to a receiver. In order to secure
it, the plaintext is encrypted so as to prevent eavesdroppers
from reading its contents. This ciphertext is then transmit-
ted to the receiver. Shannon’s cipher system (mentioned by
Yamamoto [15]) incorporates this idea. The definition of
Shannon’s cipher system has been discussed by Hanawal and
Sundaresan [16]. In Yamamoto’s [15] development on this
model, a correlated source approach is introduced.
Shannon’s secrecy model is an interesting avenue for this
work. Previous work [9] has looked at a model for Shannon’s
cipher system when there is an eavesdropper at the channel
only. Merhav [17] investigated similarly, for a model using
the additional parameters; namely, the distortion of the source
reconstruction at the legitimate receiver, the bandwidth expan-
sion factor of the coded channels, and the average transmission
cost.
The paper is arranged in four sections. Section II puts forth
the model and its description, where the proofs for the channel
and key rate bounds to attain perfect secrecy for this model
described here are detailed in Section IV. Section III details a
method to reduce the key length. Lastly, the paper is concluded
in Section V.
II. MODEL
The independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) sources X
and Y are mutually correlated random variables, depicted
in Figure 1. The alphabet sets for sources X and Y are
represented by X and Y respectively. Assume that (XK ,
Y K) are encoded into two channel information portions (TX
and TY ). We can write TX = F (XK) and TY = F (Y K)
where TX and TY are the channel information of X and Y .
This channel information can be represented by common or
private information. Here, TX and TY are characterized by
(VX , VCX) = F
′(TX) and (VY , VCY ) = F ′(TY ). The Venn
diagram in Figure 2 easily illustrates this idea where it is
shown that VX and VY represent the private information of
sources X and Y respectively and VCX and VCY represent
the common information between XK and Y K generated by
XK and Y K respectively. Each source is composed of two
components; XK1 and XK2 for XK and Y K1 and Y K2 for
Y K , of which one component is leaked to the eavesdropper.
Here, the lengths K1 and K2 are related to K as follows:
K1 +K2 = K. Due to the stationary nature of the sources, if
Y K2 is known by the wiretapper then it corresponds to XK2
been known about XK , as the wiretapper has access to certain
common information between the sources.
Both the transmitter and receiver have access to the key,
a random variable, independent of XK and Y K and taking
values in IMK = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MK −1}. The sources XK and
Y K compute the ciphertexts X
′
and Y
′
, which are the result
of specific encryption functions on the plaintext from X and
Y respectively. The encryption functions are invertible, thus
knowing X
′
and the key, XK can be retrieved. The mutual in-
formation between the plaintext and ciphertext should be small
so that the wiretapper cannot gain much information about the
plaintext. For perfect secrecy, this mutual information should
be zero, then the length of the key should be at least the length
of the plaintext.
The correlated sources X and Y transmit messages (in
the form of some channel information) to the receiver along
the channel with an eavesdropper. The decoder determines X
and Y only after receiving all of TX and TY . The common
information between the sources are transmitted through the
portions VCX and VCY . In order to decode a transmitted
message, a source’s private information and both common
information portions are necessary. This aids in security as
it is not possible to determine, for example X by wiretapping
all the contents transmitted along X’s channel and the part
of X’s data symbols corresponding to the wiretapped channel
information only. This is different to Yamamoto’s [15] model
as here the common information consists of two portions.
The eavesdropper has access to either the common or
private portions given by TY and/or TX and some data
symbols from the corresponding source (Y K2 ). The effect
is that the eavesdropper has access to some compressed
information (that is transmitted across the communication
link after encoding) and some uncompressed information (i.e.
the source’s data symbols). There is a mapping/function that
describes the relation between the uncompressed information
and the compressed information. This implies that certain
3source bits correspond to certain compressed bits transmitted
as channel information. It is valuable to determine how much
of information to transmit at a time such that the eavesdropper
cannot access the information (this is described in the next
section).
The correlated sources X and Y transmit messages (in the
form of syndromes) to the receiver along wiretapped links.
The decoder determines X and Y only after receiving all of
TX and TY . The common information between the sources are
transmitted through the portions VCX and VCY . In order to
decode a transmitted message, a source’s private information
and both common information portions are necessary. This
aids in security as it is not possible to determine, for example
X by wiretapping all the contents transmitted along X’s
channel only. This is different to Yamamoto’s [15] model as
here the common information consists of two portions. The
aim is to keep the system as secure as possible and these
following sections show how it is achieved by this new model.
kX , kY
W2W1
kX , kY
XˆK , Yˆ K
Encoder Encoder
Decoder
XK Y K
XK1 XK2 Y K1 Y K2
Wiretapper
Figure 1. Shannon cipher system for two correlated sources with wiretapped
source symbols
VX VY
VCX VCY
X Y
TX = (VX , VCX) TY = (VY , VCY )
Figure 2. The relation between private and common information
The encoder functions for X and Y , (EX and EY respec-
tively) are given as:
EX : (XK1 ,XK2)× IMkX → IM ′X = {0, 1, . . . ,M ′X − 1}
IM ′CX = {0, 1, . . . , (1)
M ′CX − 1} (2)
EY : (YK1 ,YK2)× IMkY → IM ′Y = {0, 1, . . . ,M ′Y − 1}
IM ′CY = {0, 1, . . . , (3)
M ′CY − 1} (4)
The decoder is defined as:
DXY : (IM ′X , IM ′Y , IM ′CX , IM ′CY ) × IMkX , IMkY
→ XK × YK (5)
The encoder and decoder mappings are below:
W1 = FEX (X
K1 , XK2 ,WkX) (6)
W2 = FEY (Y
K1 , Y K2 ,WkY ) (7)
X̂K = FDX (W1,W2,WkX) (8)
Ŷ K = FDY (W1,W2,WkY ) (9)
or
(X̂K , Ŷ K) = FDXY (W1,W2,WkX ,WkY ) (10)
The following conditions should be satisfied for cases 1- 4:
1
K
logMX ≤ RX +  (11)
1
K
logMY ≤ RY +  (12)
1
K
logMkX ≤ RX +  (13)
1
K
logMkY ≤ RkY +  (14)
Pr{X̂K 6= XK} ≤  (15)
Pr{Ŷ K 6= Y K} ≤  (16)
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2) ≤ hX +  (17)
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2) ≤ hY +  (18)
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2) ≤ hXY +  (19)
4where RX is the rate of source X’s channel and RY is
the rate of source Y ’s channel. Here, (RkX , RkY ) is the
rate of the key channel when allocating a key to X and Y .
The security level for X and Y are measured by the total
and individual uncertainties, (hX , hY ). Here, hXXY and h
Y
XY
represent the security level of X and Y with respect to X
and Y respectively.
The cases 1 - 3 are:
Case 1: When (W1,W2, Y K2) is leaked and (XK , Y K)
needs to be kept secret. The security level of concern is
represented by 1KH(X
K , Y K |W1,W2).
Case 2: When (W1,W2, Y K2) is leaked and (XK , Y K)
needs to be kept secret. The security level of concern is
represented by ( 1KH(X
K |W1,W2), 1KH(Y K |W1,W2)).
Case 3: When (W1,W2, Y K2) is leaked and Y K needs to be
kept secret.The security level of concern is represented by
1
KH(Y
K |W1,W2).
The admissible rate region for each case is defined as
follows:
Definition 1a: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible for
case 1 if there exists a code (FEX , FDXY ) such that (11) -
(16) and (19) hold for any → 0 and sufficiently large K.
Definition 1b: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible
for case 2 if there exists a code (FEY , FDXY ) such that (11)
- (18) hold for any → 0 and sufficiently large K.
Definition 1c: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hY ) is admissible for
case 3 if there exists a code (FEX , FDXY ) and (FEY , FDXY )
such that (11) - (16) and (18) hold for any  → 0 and
sufficiently large K.
Definition 2: The admissible rate regions of Rj for case j
are defined as:
R1(hXY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible for case 1} (20)
R2(hX , hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for case 2} (21)
R3(hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hY ) is admissible for case 3} (22)
Theorems for these regions have been developed:
Theorem 1: For 0 ≤ hXY ≤ H(X,Y )− µC − µY and
R1(hXY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y ) and
RkX +RkY ≥ hXY } (23)
Theorem 2: For 0 ≤ hX ≤ H(X)− µC and
0 ≤ hY ≤ H(Y )− µC − µY ,
R2(hX , hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y ) and
RkX +RkY ≥ max(hX , hY )} (24)
where R1 and R2 are the regions for cases 1 and 2
respectively.
Corollary 1: For 0 ≤ hY ≤ H(Y )− µC − µY ,
R3(hY ) = R2(0, hY )
The code achieving these bounds for case 2 allows for the key
length of hY to be achieved across Y ’s channel in case 3. The
security levels, which are measured by the individual uncer-
tainties (hX , hY ) and total uncertainty hXY give an indication
of the level of uncertainty in knowing certain information.
When the uncertainty increases then less information is known
to an eavesdropper and there is a higher level of security.
III. DISCUSSION
Each message transmitted requires a key, as described
in Section II. If only Y ’s channel is wiretapped then X
does not need a key for keeping messages confidential. For
this model however, we describe cases where the channel
information from both X and Y are wiretapped. In all cases,
Y K2 is also leaked to the wiretapper. This is what makes
the adversary more powerful. This model may be used in a
communication system that has some preexisting information
known. This is common as information known by certain
communication protocols could serve as the preexisting infor-
mation. Here, YK2 could contain some private information and
some common information. The wiretapper could thus gain
private and/or common information about the source Y K . The
information gained through Y K2 may or may not correspond
to the information leaked across Y ’s channel (the compressed
and uncompressed information have a certain relationship, as
described in Section II).
In this model, a key can be provided by either X or Y as we
have a common key channel. This means that if X allocates
a key then Y can make use of the same key once.
Correlated source compression reduces the bandwidth of
the transmitted message, hence the key length required for
this scenario is less than a case for when there is no source
compression. The reduced bandwidth is also a security advan-
tage as the message entropy is higher. One masking method
to reduce the key length is to use a portion where a key has
already been allocated to mask a portion that needs to be
covered. This is able to provide confidentiality as a key would.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREMS 1 - 2
We construct a code based on the prototype code
(WX ,WY ,WCX ,WCY ) described below:
For any 0 ≥ 0 and sufficiently large K, there exits a code
WX = FX(X
K), WY = FY (Y K), WCX = FCX(XK),
WCY = FCY (Y
K), X̂K , Ŷ K = G(WX ,WY ,WCX ,WCY ),
5where WX ∈ IMX , WY ∈ IMY , WCX ∈ IMCX , WCY ∈
IMCY for IMα , which is defined as {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}, that
satisfies,
Pr{X̂K , Ŷ K 6= XK , Y K} ≤  (25)
H(X|Y )− 0 ≤ 1
K
H(WX) ≤ 1
K
logMX
≤ H(X|Y ) + 0 (26)
H(Y |X)− 0 ≤ 1
K
H(WY ) ≤ 1
K
logMY
≤ H(Y |X) + 0 (27)
I(X;Y )− 0 ≤ 1
K
(H(WCX) +H(WCY ))
≤ 1
K
(logMCX + logMCY ) ≤ I(X;Y ) + 0 (28)
1
K
H(XK |WY ) ≥ H(X)− 0 (29)
1
K
H(Y K |WX) ≥ H(Y )− 0 (30)
We can see that (26) - (28) mean
H(X,Y )− 30 ≤ 1
K
(H(WX) +H(WY ) +H(WCX)
+ H(WCY )) ≤ H(X,Y ) + 30 (31)
Hence from (25), (31) and the ordinary source coding
theorem, (WX , WY , WCX , WCY ) have no redundancy for
sufficiently small 0 ≥ 0. It can also be seen that WX and
WY are independent of Y K and XK respectively. Equations
(25) - (31) have been proven in [9]. In order to include a key
in the prototype code, WX is divided into two parts as per the
method used by Yamamoto [15]:
WX1 =WX mod MX1 ∈ IMX1 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MX1 − 1} (32)
WX2 =
WX −WX1
MX1
∈ IMX2 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MX2 − 1} (33)
where MX1 is a given integer and MX2 is the ceiling
of MX/MX1. The MX/MX1 is considered an integer for
simplicity, because the difference between the ceiling value
and the actual value can be ignored when K is sufficiently
large. In the same way, WY is divided:
WY 1 =WY mod MY 1 ∈ IMY 1 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MY 1 − 1} (34)
WY 2 =
WY −WY 1
MY 1
∈ IMY 2 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MY 2 − 1} (35)
The common information components WCX and WCY are
already portions and are not divided further. In this scenario
WCX +WCY lies between 0 and I(X;Y ). It can be repre-
sented by X and Y , X only or Y only. It can be shown that
when some of the codewords are wiretapped the uncertainties
of XK and Y K are bounded as follows:
1
K
H(XK |WX2,WY ) ≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMX1 − ′0 (36)
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY 2) ≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1 − ′0 (37)
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY 2) ≥ I(X;Y )− ′0 (38)
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (39)
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (40)
1
K
H(XK |WY ,WCY ) ≥ H(X|Y ) + 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (41)
1
K
H(Y K |WY ,WCY ) ≥ H(Y |X) + 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (42)
1
K2
H(Y K2) ≥ µC + µY − ′0 (43)
where 
′
0 → 0 as 0 → 0. Here, we indicate the wiretapped
source symbols with the entropy in (43), where µC and µY
are the common and private portions of the i.i.d source Y that
are contained in Y K2 per symbol. Here, YK2 is proportional
to K.
The proofs for (36) - (42) are the same as per Yamamoto’s
[15] proof in Lemma A1. The difference is that WCX , WCY ,
MCX and MCY are described as WC1, WC2, MC1 and
MC2 respectively by Yamamoto. Here, we consider that WCX
and WCY are represented by Yamamoto’s WC1 and WC2
respectively. In addition there are some more inequalities
considered here to describe the model better:
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WCX ,WCY ,WY 2) ≥ 1
K
logMY 1
− ′0 (44)
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WCX ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMY 1
+
1
K
logMY 2 − ′0 (45)
1
K
H(XK |WX2,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMX1
+
1
K
logMCX − ′0 (46)
61
K
H(Y K |WX2,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMY 1
+
1
K
logMY 2 +
1
K
logMCX
− ′0 (47)
The inequalities (44) and (45) can be proved in the same
way as per Yamamoto’s [15] Lemma A2, and (46) and (47) can
be proved in the same way as per Yamamoto’s [15] Lemma
A1.
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose that (RX , RY , RkX , RkY )
∈ R1 for hXY ≤ H(X,Y ) − µC − µY . Without loss of
generality, we assume that hXY ≤ RkX + RkY . Then, from
(23)
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (48)
RkX +RkY ≥ hXY (49)
Here the keys are uniform random numbers. For the first
case, consider the following: hXY > I(X;Y ).
MX1 = min(2KH(X|Y ), 2K(hXY −I(X;Y ))) (50)
MY 1 = 2
K(hXY −I(X;Y )) (51)
The codewords W1 and W2 and the key WkXand WkY are
now defined:
W1 = (WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (52)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (53)
WkX =WkCX (54)
WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (55)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know WX1, WCX WY 1 and WCY as these are
protected by keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy from (26) -
(28) and (48) - (55), that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 30
= H(X,Y ) + 30
≤ RX +RY + 30 (56)
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ]
=
1
K
[logMCX + logMCY + logMY 1]
≤ I(X;Y ) + hXY − I(X;Y )− 0 (57)
= hXY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY − 0 (58)
where (77) results from (51).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2, Y K2)
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,
WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2
WCY ⊕WkCY , Y K2)
≥ 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1,WX2,
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2, Y K2)− ′′0 (59)
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX ,WY 2, Y K2)− ′′0
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1
− µC − µY − 2′0 − 
′′
0
= I(X;Y ) + hXY − I(X;Y )− µC − µY
− 2′0 − 
′′
0
= hXY − µC − µY − 2′0 − 
′′
0 (60)
where (59) holds because WCX and WCY are covered by
uniform random keys and the result of Yamamoto’s Lemma
A2.
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible from
(56) - (60).
Next the case where: hXY ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. The
codewords and keys are now defined:
W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (61)
W2 = (WY 1,WY 2,WCY ) (62)
WkX = (WkCX) (63)
MCX = 2
KhXY (64)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know the WX and WY that are covered with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
logMCX
= hXY
≤ RkX +RkY (65)
7where (65) results from (64).
The security level thus results:
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2, Y K2) = 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1,WX2,
WCX ⊕WkCX ,
WY 1,WY 2,WCY ,
Y K2)
≥ 1
K
logMCX − µC − 2′0
= hXY − µC − 2′0 (66)
≥ hXY − 2′0 (67)
where (91) holds from (64).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible from
(61) - (67).
Proof of Theorem 2: In the same way, Suppose that
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) ∈ R2 for hX ≤ H(X) − µC and
hY ≤ H(Y )−µC−µY . Without loss of generality, we assume
that hX ≤ hY and hX + hY ≤ RkX +RkY . Then, from (24)
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (68)
hX + hY ≤ RkX +RkY (69)
Consider the following: hX > I(X;Y ).
MX1 = min(2KH(X|Y ), 2K(hY −I(X;Y ))) (70)
MY 1 = 2
K(hY −I(X;Y )) (71)
The codeword W2 and the key WkY is now defined:
W1 = (WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (72)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (73)
WkX =WkCX (74)
WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (75)
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy from (26) -
(28) and (70) - (75), that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 30
= H(X,Y ) + 30
≤ RX +RY + 30 (76)
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ]
=
1
K
[logMCX + logMCY + logMY 1]
≤ I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )− 0 (77)
= hY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY − 0 (78)
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2, Y K2)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY , Y K2)
≥ 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1(79)
WY 2, Y
K2)− ′′0
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX2,WY 2, Y K2)− ′′0
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMX1 − µC − 2′0 − 
′′
0
= I(X;Y ) + min(2KH(X|Y ), 2hY −I(X;Y ))
− µC − 2′0 − 
′′
0
≥ hY − µC − 2′0 − 
′′
0
≥ hX (80)
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2) = 1
K
H(Y K |WX1 ⊕WkX1,
WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2
WCY ⊕WkCY , Y K2)
≥ 1
K
logMY 1 + I(X;Y )− µC − µY − ′0
= I(X;Y ) + min(H(X|Y ), hY − I(X;Y ))
− µC − µY − ′0 (81)
≥ hY − ′0 (82)
where (81) comes from (71).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible
from (76) - (82).
Next the case where hX ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. If hY >
I(X;Y ) the following results. The codewords W1 and W2
and their keys WkX and WkY are now defined:
8W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (83)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (84)
WkX = (WkCX) (85)
WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (86)
MY 1 = 2
K(hY −I(X;Y )) (87)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know the WX and WY that are covered with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
[logMCX + logMY 1 + logMCY ]
≤ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1 − 0
= I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )− 0 (88)
= hY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY + 0 (89)
where (88) results from (87).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,
WCY ⊕WkCY , Y K2)
≥ I(X;Y )− µC − ′0 (90)
= I(X;Y )− µC − ′0 (91)
≥ hX − ′0 (92)
where (91) results from (87).
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(Y K |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,
WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY , Y K2)
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1
− µC − µY − 0 (93)
= I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )
− µC − µY − ′0 (94)
≥ hY − ′0 (95)
where (94) holds from (87).
Next the case where hY ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. The
codewords W1 and W2 and their keys WkX and WkY are
now defined:
W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (96)
W2 = (WY 1,WY 2,WCY ) (97)
WkX =WkCX (98)
MCX = 2
KhY (99)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know the WX and WY that are covered with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
logMCX
= hY (100)
≤ RkX +RkY (101)
where (100) results from (99).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1,WY 2,
WCY , Y
K2)
≥ hY − µC − ′0 (102)
≥ hX − ′0 (103)
where (102) results from (99).
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2) = 1
K
H(Y K |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1,WY 2,
WCY , Y
K2)
≥ hY − µC − µY − 0 (104)
≥ hY − ′0 (105)
where (104) holds from (99).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for
min(hX , hY ) (96) - (105).
A. Converse proofs for Theorems 1-2
From Slepian-Wolf’s theorem we know that the channel
rate must satisfy RX ≥ H(X|Y ), RY ≥ H(Y |X) and
RX + RY ≥ H(X,Y ) to achieve a low error probability
when decoding. Hence, only the key rates are considered in
this subsection.
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RkX ≥ 1
K
logMkX − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX)− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkX)− I(WkX ;W )]− 
=
1
K
H(WkX |XK , Y K ,W ) + I(WkX ;W )
+ I(WkX ;X|Y,W ) + I(X,Y,WkX |W )
+ I(Y,WkX |X,W )− I(WkX ;W )− 
=
1
K
[H(XK , Y K |W )−H(XK , Y K |W,WkX)]− 
≥ hXY − 1
K
H(XK , Y K |W,WkX)−  (106)
= hXY − 1
K
H(Y K |XK)− µC − − ′′0
≥ hXY − µC − − ′′0 (107)
where W = (W1,W2, Y K2) are the wiretapped portions,
(106) results from equation (19). Here, we consider the ex-
tremes of H(Y |X) and H(WY ) in order to determine the
limit for RkX . When this quantity is minimum then we are
able to achieve the maximum bound of hXY .
RkY ≥ 1
K
logMkY − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY )− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkY )− I(WkY ;W )− 
=
1
K
H(WkY |X,Y,W ) + I(WkY ;W )
+ I(WkY ;X|Y,W ) + I(X,Y,WkY |W )
+ I(Y,WkY |X,W )− I(WkY ;W )]− 
=
1
K
[H(XK , Y K |W )−H(XK , Y K |W,WkY )]− 
≥ hXY − 1
K
H(XK , Y K |W,WkY )−  (108)
= hXY − 1
K
H(XK |Y K)− µC − µY − − ′′0
≥ hXY − µC − µY − − ′′0 (109)
where (108) results from equation (19). Here, we consider
the extremes of H(X|Y ) in order to determine the limit for
RkY . When this quantity is minimum then we are able to
achieve the maximum bound of hXY .
Converse part of Theorem 2:
RkX ≥ 1
K
logMkX − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX)− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkX)− I(WkX ;W )]− 
=
1
K
H((WkX |XK ,W ) + I(WkX ;W )
+ I(X,WkX |W )− I(WkX ;W )− 
≥ 1
K
I(XK ,WkX |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(XK |W )−H(XK |W,WkX)]− 
≥ hX −H(WCY )− µC − − ′′0 (110)
≥ hX − µC − − ′′0 (111)
where W = (W1,W2), (110) results from (17). The
consideration here is that H(Y K2) represents the preexisting
information known to an eavesdropper as an extreme case
scenario. Here, we can also consider the extremes of H(WCY )
in order to determine the limit for RkX . When this quantity
is minimum then we are able to achieve the maximum bound
of hX .
RkY ≥ 1
K
logMkY − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY )− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkY )− I(WkY ;W )]− 
=
1
K
H(WkY |Y K ,W ) + I(WkY ;W )
+ I(X,WkY |W )− I(WkY ;W )− 
≥ 1
K
I(Y K ,WkY |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(Y K |W )−H(Y K |W,WkY )]− 
≥ hY −H(WCX)− µC − µY − − ′′0 (112)
≥ hY − µC − µY − − ′′0 (113)
where (110) results from (18). The same consideration as
above for H(Y K2) is presented here. Here, we consider the
extremes of H(WCX) in order to determine the limit for RkY .
When this quantity is minimum then we are able to achieve
the maximum bound of hY .
V. CONCLUSION
A Shannon cipher approach for two correlated sources
with compromised source symbols across a channel with an
eavesdropper has been detailed. This is a more generalised
approach of Yamamoto’s [15] model and has made use of
the idea of wiretapping source bits from Luo et al. [5].
From Section II it has been noticed that the model can be
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implemented for more than two sources with Shannon’s cipher
system. The channel and key rates to achieve perfect secrecy
have been provided, where the rates have been quantified in
terms of bounds for the channel and key rates. A method to
reduce the key length via masking using bits that were not
eavesdropped was also detailed.
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